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I develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained (yet individually rational) distortions 
in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets. In processing and 
interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education, health 
insurance, pensions, etc., individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about 
their future prospects (or their children’s) versus the costs of misinformed decisions. Because 
these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts 
with realism or denial, endogenous social cognitions emerge. Thus, an equilibrium in which 
people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain 
obstinately blind to them, embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large 
government. Conversely, an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to 
market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez-faire ideology and blind faith in the 
invisible hand. With public-sector capital, this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to 
history-dependent dynamics. The model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up 
constitutional protections for dissenting views, even when ex-post everyone would prefer to 
ignore unwelcome news. 
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Daron Acemoglu, Rafael Di Tella, Xavier Gabaix, Mohammad Yildiz, Jean-Charles Rochet, Tom 
Romer, Karl Schlag, and Glen Weyl. Rainer Schwabe provided superb research assistance. Support 
from the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research is gratefully acknowledged. “Social scientists have incorporated the costliness of information in their models, but have not
come to grips with the subjective mental constructs by which individuals process information
and arrive at conclusions that shape their choices....
“The subjective mental constructs of the participants will evolve an ideology that not only
rationalizes the society’s structure but accounts for its poor performance. As a result, the
economy will evolve policies that reinforce the existing incentives and organizations.
Douglass North, (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
1 Introduction
Coined on the eve of the 19th century by the Enlightenment philosopher and economist Destutt
de Tracy, ideologie originally carried a hopeful connotation: it was to be a new “science of ideas”
that would unify the social, political and moral sciences, starting from a common foundation
in psychology.1 Over the next two hundred years, the word took on a variety of less positive
meanings (starting with Marx and Engels’ writings on the subject) and today it most often
designates a system of beliefs that some group collectively upholds and maintains rigidly, even
though it involves a substantial degree of reality denial or “false consciousness”. It also implicitly
conveys the notion of ideologies as competing and mutually incompatible worldviews.
In this paper I take ideology in both senses of the term. First, as an exercise in the study of
ideas, by providing a model and describing recent work that answers the call for incorporating
into political economy a more accurate representation of individuals’ “subjective mental con-
structs”. Second, by showing how these interact across agents and with institutions to generate
social cognitions that rest on distorted perceptions of reality, yet persist over time.
In doing so, I focus more concretely on one perennial ideological battleground: the relative
merits of the market and the state. Figure 1 provides a good illustration of the range and
clustering of these beliefs. Among Americans, for instance, about 72% express conﬁdence in
the free-market system and free enterprise —predictably above the survey’s average of 65%, but
below China’s striking 74%. Among the French, only 36%, or half as many, agree —even lower
than Russia’s 43%, and considerably below neighboring Germany’s 65%.
These are striking diﬀerences, and they have real meaning. In Figure 2, I plot the size of
the government’s “footprint” in the economy, measured by the share of taxes in GDP, against
the extent of free-market beliefs in the country (from Figure 1). This reveals a negative and
signiﬁcant correlation, consistent with the view that popular beliefs shape policy, not just in
1Antoine Louis Claude, comte Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), in his Eléments d’Idéologie, published between
1801 to 1815. De Tracy’s own political views favored republicanism, liberalism and free markets. He was an
admirer of American democracy and, conversely, Thomas Jeﬀerson was an admirer of his work, translating into
English his Treatise on Political Economy.
1Figure 1: Responses to the statement: “The free enterprise system and free market economy is the best
system on which to base the future of the world.” Source: World Public Opinion Survey (2005).
democracies.2 The question, however, is where these beliefs come from and how they can
persistently diverge, especially in an age of widely available and cheap information. Another
piece of the puzzle is that within any given country, the dominant beliefs are often demonstrably
at odds with the facts.3 Nonetheless they endure, and the power of collective reality-avoidance
and adherence to comforting myths is often seen as a signiﬁcant obstacle to necessary reforms.
To analyze these issues, I develop in this paper a simple model of ideology as collectively
sustained reality distortions about the merits of state versus market. Agents vote over the extent
to which a good with long-run payoﬀs such as education, health insurance, or pensions should
be publicly provided or left to individual decisions. They also allocate their disposable income
in ways that reﬂect their expectations of what the state or market will ultimately deliver. The
relative eﬃcacy of public and private provision is a priori uncertain. Agents observe a common
signal about this variable (e.g., performance in the past or in other areas), which they can then
2Other measures, such as the restrictiveness of labor laws or overall regulation in the economy lead to similar
results, but are available for only a smaller sample of countries (ten to twelve OECD nations).
3See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation et al. (1996a) and Caplan (2007) on the public’s distorted views of competition,
ﬁrms and international trade; Kaiser Foundation et al. (1996b) on their distorted views of government; Gilens
(1999), Kuklinski et al. (2000) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) on misperceptions and stereotypes about welfare
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Tax / GDP  = 27.73   -  0.22  *  Belief in free market
                      (4.19)      (-2.01)
Figure 2: Free-market beliefs and size of the state. Source: author’s calculations, based on data from
World Development Survey (2005) and World Development Indicators (2004).
process objectively or subjectively: paying attention to and acknowledging it, or on the contrary
dismissing it, rationalizing it away and more generally minimizing their awareness of its content.
In doing so, each agent optimally trades oﬀ the value of maintaining a reassuring, hopeful view of
their future prospects or those of their children (anticipatory utility) versus the costs of delusion,
in particular misallocating their own resources.
The key point is that these “subjective mental constructs” are inevitably interdependent
(as noted by North), even absent any built-in complementarities: the relative attractiveness of
realism and denial depends on other agents’ voting and private decisions, and therefore on the
extent to which they themselves embrace reality or avert their eyes from it. “Social cognitions”
thus endogenously emerge. I ﬁrst show how a realistic equilibrium, in which people acknowledge
the limitations and burdens of the welfare state, can coexist with one in which they remain blind
to them, embracing a statist ideology and voting for a large but ineﬀective government. I then
show how the presence of market failures can give rise to the converse scenario, in which a real-
istic equilibrium associated with appropriate public interventions coexists with one dominated
by laissez-faire ideology and blind faith in unhindered markets. The role of history —working
through inherited public-sector capital and prior beliefs— in determining which ideology prevails
is also investigated, with the interplay of beliefs and institutions generating path-dependent dy-
namics. Finally, the welfare analysis explains why societies ﬁnd it desirable to set up (ex-ante)
constitutional protections for the expression of dissenting views —guarantees of free speech, a
free press, etc.— even when ex-post everyone (not just a majority) would want to ignore bad
news or “kill” their messenger.
3The model builds on and extends the motivated-beliefs and optimal-awareness (attention,
memory) framework of Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2004, 2006). It relates most closely to Bén-
abou (2007), in which I develop a general theory of “groupthink” as individually rational but
collectively sustained episodes of wishful thinking in groups, organizations, and markets.
1.1 Related literature
The perceived merits and ﬂaws of markets and governments are among a number of societal
beliefs about “how the world works” that are attracting increasing attention from economists.
Other important ones include those bearing on the role of eﬀo r tv e r s u sl u c ki nl i f eo u t c o m e s , 4 the
extent to which other people (or speciﬁc groups) can be trusted,5 many aspects of culture and
of course religion.6 These beliefs all share with those displayed in Figures 1-2 ﬁve key features,
which I take as constitutive of ideologies (good or bad):
1) They vary widely across countries (even similarly developed ones) and are correlated with
important political and economic outcomes.
2) At the individual level, they are strong predictors of voter preferences (toward redis-
tribution, regulation, criminal justice, etc.) as well as important personal behaviors (savings,
entrepreneurship, etc.).
3) There is a tendency for each society or group to think that its vision or “model” is the
right one, not just for itself but for others as well.
4) Inevitably since not everyone can be right, these beliefs are often clearly at odds with the
relevant facts.7
5) Nonetheless they persist, displaying remarkable “immunity to evidence” and powerfully
shaping the societies in which they take hold.
The idea that voters’ attitudes often reﬂects distorted beliefs which they are aﬀectively,
culturally or instrumentally attached to is common in political science and political psychol-
ogy (e.g., Lane (1959), Lerner (1982), Hochschild (1981, 1996), Kuran (1995), Jost and Major
(2001)).
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) provide a ﬁrst model of such phenomena for a broad class of
beliefs relating to the long-term rewards for personal eﬀort: “just-world” beliefs about self-
reliance and economic mobility, perceptions of the link between income and happiness, and
4See, e.g., Piketty (1995), Bénabou and Ok (2001), Fong (2001), Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Di Tella et al. (2007).
5See, e.g., Tirole (1996), Tabellini (2006, 2008), Putnam (2007) and Guiso et al. (2007).
6On culture, see, e.g. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), Guiso et al. (2006) and Fernandez and Fogli (2006). On
religion, see e.g. Barro and McCleary (2003), Noland (2003), Guiso et al. (2003), Scheve and Stasavage (2006),
and Levy and Razin (2007).
7On the distorted nature of popular beliefs, see the references in footnote 3; for their persistence, see also Ferrie
(2005) on misperceptions of American “exceptionalism” in social mobility, and Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)
on attitudes towards government intervention in West versus former East Germany. Religion provides many other
examples (for (3) as well as (5)), such as creationism versus evolution and geology.
4religious doctrines oﬀering diﬀerent “afterlife incentives” for thrift and industriousness. In that
model, optimistic beliefs about the fact that everyone will ultimately get their “just deserts”
have a functional value: they help individuals motivate themselves or their children towards
eﬀort, educational investment, perseverance against adversity and away from the temptations
of idleness, welfare dependency, etc. This motivation value, moreover, depends on the incentive
properties of the institutions which agents face: it is higher in a society that carries out little
redistribution than where marginal taxes are high and the safety net generous. Since the political
outcome itself depends on what people believe, there can be two stable outcomes. A ﬁrst,
“American” equilibrium is characterized by a dominance of just-world beliefs (and resistance to
contrary evidence), low redistribution, high eﬀort and stigma attached to poverty. The second,
“European” equilibrium is characterized by more “realistic pessimism” as the majority view,
a more extensive welfare state, more blaming of poverty on luck and circumstances, and lower
eﬀort.8
In this paper I take up a diﬀerent but equally important set of societal beliefs, namely those
concerning the relative virtues of markets and governments in delivering goods and services,
p a r t i c u l a r l yt h o s et h a th a v es o c i e t y - w i d eb e n e ﬁts such as education, health, or safety. I also
emphasize the very diﬀerent source of motivated beliefs (hedonic anticipatory feelings instead of
instrumental self-motivation) that is relevant when uncertainty and the ideological debate bear
on the value of public goods and interventions in the market, rather than on how individuals
come to be rich or poor.
This research thus brings together two literatures. The ﬁrst, emanating from the recent
ﬁeld of “economics and psychology,” focusses on cognitive dissonance, wishful thinking and
other forms of self-deception or belief distortion.9 The second, also fast-growing, stems from a
wealth of recent survey data on variations in beliefs and values across countries, regions or social
groups.10 Beyond economics, the paper relates to the large literatures in social and political
psychology on motivated individual beliefs and on competing “worldviews” at the societal level.
It formalizes concepts such as “system justiﬁcation” (Jost and Major (2001)), “social axioms”
(Leung et al. (2002)), or “cultural cognition” (Kahan and Braman (2006)).
The motivated, evidence-averse nature of ideological beliefs makes them quite diﬀerent from
standard self-fulﬁlling expectations. In recent politico-economic models where diﬀerent countries
8Alternative, “non-ideological” explanations are proposed by Piketty (1995), based on costly learning and
heterogenous priors about the mobility process; and by Alesina and Angeletos (2005), based on self-fulﬁlling,
accurate beliefs about the extent to which individual incomes result from productive investments.
9On cognitive dissonance and belief distortion see, e.g., Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Schelling (1986), Kuran
(1993), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2004), Battaglini et al. (2005) and Dessi (2005).
On anticipatory utility, see e.g. Loewenstein (1987), Caplin and Leahy (2001), Landier (2000), Caplin and Eliaz
(2003), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Köszegi (2006, 2007), Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) and Bénabou
and Tirole (2007).
10In addition to the references cited earlier see also Greif (2006), Cervellati et al. (2006), Corneo and Jeanne
(2007) and Saint Paul (2007).
5are identiﬁed with multiple rational-expectations equilibria,11 voters’ beliefs in each country
correspond objectively to the statistical reality they observe. They would also never refuse
information ex-ante or process it in a biased way ex-post, but treat good and bad news as
equally valuable increments to their information set. For the same reason, ideological thought is
quite diﬀerent from the public misrepresentation of one’s true beliefs due to threat of repression
or social sanctions (e.g., Kuran (1995)); and very diﬀerent as well from the oﬀ-the-equilibrium
paths beliefs used as threats to sustain certain social outcomes in repeated-game models of
culture (e.g., Greif (2006), Anderlini et al. (2007)). Ideology as motivated cognition also diﬀers
from a view based on outright indoctrination, though the two are highly complementary. Indeed,
while agents are modeled here as distorting their own processing of information, a near-identical
model applies to parents who strategically shape the beliefs of their children.12 Moreover, agents’
endogenous “demand” for beliefs can also be read as a diﬀerential receptivity to propaganda
supplied by competing political parties, interest groups and other political entrepreneurs.13
2 Ideology: the state or the market
I now turn to the study of a particular set of “ideas”, namely those concerning the proper scope
of governments and markets.
Drawing on a large comparative survey of American voters and economists (Kaiser Family
Foundation et al. (1996a)), Caplan (2007) presents extensive evidence of “anti-market bias”:
distrust of the proﬁt motive, unfairness of price allocations, perception of competition as a
rigged, negative-sum game, desire to protect existing jobs against technological change and
especially foreign competition, etc. His explanation is that voters derive consumption value
from beliefs, and since holding incorrect ones is of little personal consequence because each vote
has a negligible chance of mattering, they freely indulge in a number of exogenous “feel-good”
biases. The present analysis will share this emphasis on the consumption value of beliefs but
also diﬀer in several important ways.
First, why (or when) should anti-market beliefs and blind faith in public bureaucracies
make voters “feel better” than anti-state beliefs and blind faith in the invisible hand? The
international evidence shown in Figures 1 and 2 reveals substantial variations in these beliefs
across countries, which a theory of emotionally-thinking voters should aim to address. Second,
there are also common instances of anti-government, pro-market bias. For instance, in spite
of massive, textbook-case market failures in the employer-based system of health insurance, a
large share of American voters still perceives and fears as ineﬃcient and bureaucratic “socialized
11See, e.g., Bénabou (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
12See Bénabou and Tirole (2006) for such an equivalence in the context of anti- and pro-redistributive ideologies.
13See. e.g., Hochschild (1996), Gilens (1999), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Glaeser (2005) and Saint Paul (2007)
for work emphasizing this “supply” side of politico-economic beliefs.
6medicine” the type of single-payer or centrally regulated system found in most other countries.14
To analyze these issues, one needs to explicitly model both the economic and the psycholog-
ical costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent worldviews, and in particular how they depend endogenously
on the current or anticipated politico-economic environment.
2.1 The model
1. Technology. A continuum of risk-neutral individuals, i ∈ [0,1],a r ee n d o w e dw i t h1 unit
each of perfectly divisible labor. Labor can be transformed into a taxable market good at a rate
of 1 for 1, or into home production or other non-taxable forms of output at a rate of 1 to ¯ τ<1.
The highest feasible tax rate is thus ¯ τ, and the revenue from any rate τ ≤ ¯ τ is equal to τ.
In period 1, agents use some of their disposable resources to accumulate human capital,
broadly deﬁned (education, health), retirement assets, or some other good that might have ex-
ternal eﬀects. Such investment can take place both privately and through government provision
(e.g., public education or pension system), according to the technology:





in which E<γis some ﬁxed maximal level.15 The productivity of private expenditure is a
known γ>1, whereas that of public provision is uncertain (it could also be the reverse): θ = θH
in state H and θ = θL in state L, with prior probabilities q and 1 − q respectively, and
(2) 0 ≤ θL <γ<θ H <E / ¯ τ.
The state could thus be less eﬃcient than the market, or more. At the same time, government
resources are limited, so some private investment is always needed (¯ τθH <E ). Note also that
θτ is net of collection and administrative costs and could thus incorporate a deadweight loss,
whether as a ﬁxed proportion or as itself a source of uncertainty. In period 2, each agent, or his
oﬀspring, will have income (or some equivalent payoﬀ)
(3) yi ≡ αhi +( 1− α)¯ h,
where ¯ h is the population average and 1−α ≥ 0 represents the extent to which hi is of a public-
good nature, generating a spillover for the rest of society. The presence of such spillovers will
strengthen the results, but is not essential. It is also important to note that there is no assumed
14See, e.g., Krugman and Wells (2006) and references therein. Recall that the model developed below can also
be interpreted as explaining why agents are likely to be diﬀerentially receptive to arguments or propaganda from
diﬀerent sides of a contested issue.
15This speciﬁcation is chosen for simplicity, as it allows for substitutability between public and private invest-
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Figure 3: The state and the market: timeline
complementarity between agents’ choices.
2. Preferences and decisions. During period 1, agents ﬁr s tv o t eo nt h et a xr a t eτ,
then make their individual investments, ei; s e eF i g u r e3 . 16 The remainder of their disposable
income is saved until period 2, at which time it is consumed (or split between consumption and
a bequest), resulting in ﬁnal utility17
(4) Ui
2 =1− τ − ei + yi.
The only payoﬀ received by an agent during period 1 stems from thoughts and feelings about his
future prospects. Thus, from the time when τ and the ei’s are chosen and until all uncertainty






, where s ≥ 0
parametrizes the importance of hope, anxiety, dread, and similar emotions. This parameter
(which stands for “savoring”) also typically increases with the length of period 1.18 Anticipatory
feelings could also occur prior to the determination of public and private investments; I leave this
extension to the appendix and will simply mention in the text the one place where it matters.
Given the tax rate, individual investment is chosen so as to maximize the discounted value
16Since agents know τ when they choose eﬀort, multiple equilibria due to standard “increasing ﬁscal returns”
or “battle of the sexes” mechanisms between the private and public sectors are —intentionally— ruled out. The
mechanism is also very diﬀerent from that in Bénabou and Tirole (2006), as τ is here a lump-sum tax and thus
h a sn oi n c e n t i v ee ﬀect. The psychological motive underlying belief distortions also diﬀers, as explained earlier.
17The assumption that agents only want to consume in period 2 is inessential, as is the zero interest rate. It just
simpliﬁes the exposition by making standard, material consumption (derived from the resources 1 − τ − e
i + y
i)
and “belief consumption” take place in separate periods, rather than having some of both occur in period 1. For
the intergenerational interpretation, let a parent have utility v(c,b,y) ≡ c
β(b + y)
1−β/β
β (1 − β)
1−β over old-age
consumption c, her ﬁnancial bequest to her child b, and the latter’s eﬀective human capital endowment y, given by
(3). Given any initial inherited wealth b







This is also her maximized date-2 utility v
i, which thus diﬀers from U
i
2 only by a constant.
18See, e.g., Caplin and Leahy (2001), Köszegi (2006, 2007), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) or Bénabou and
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Naturally, someone who is more optimistic about the public provision of education or retirement
income (say) will rely less on the market. In particular, as long as
(7) αγ > 1 ≥ (1 − q)αγ,
an agent who has no credible information beyond his prior (μi = q) will only invest ei =
(E − τθH)/γ, whereas one who knows that the state is L (μi =0 )will invest ei =( E − τθL)/γ.
An agent’s beliefs at t =1depend on the news received at t =0and how he processed them
—accepting reality or averting his eyes from it, as speciﬁed below. In doing so, he acts so as to
maximize the discounted utility of all payoﬀs
(8) Ui
















where M represents the date-0 costs, if any, of his information-processing strategy and Ei
t
reﬂects his beliefs at date t =0 ,1. Equation (8) embodies the key tradeoﬀ between having






, and having hopeful







3. Information and beliefs. To represent agents’ optimal processing of information I
use a variant of the recall or awareness “technology” from Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006).
At t =0 , agents observe a common signal about the eﬃcacy of state intervention: σ = H,L,
with probabilities q and 1 − q respectively.19 This could be a measure of past performance, the
policies and outcomes of other countries, an expert study, or media reports. Each agent then
has some ﬂexibility in how much attention to pay to this data, how to interpret it, whether to
“keep it in mind” or “not think about it”, etc. Formally, he can :
(a) Accept the news realistically, thus truthfully encoding ˆ σi = σ into memory or awareness
(his date-1 information set).
19The fact that σ is fully informative about θ is only a simplifying assumption; nothing changes if the signal is
noisy. The perfect correlation of signals across individuals is chosen for the same reason (it just needs to be high
enough) and to make clear that the mechanism at work here has nothing to do with herding or informational
cascades, in which agents with private signals make inferences from each other’s behavior.
9(b) Engage in denial or censoring, thus encoding ˆ σi = H instead of σ = L, or ˆ σi = H instead
of σ = L. In addition to distorting later decisions, this may entail an immediate cost m ≥ 0.
(c) Deal in partial truths, by using a mixed strategy. The relevant (stable) equilibria of the
model, however, will turn out to be in pure strategies.
Instead of “tuning out” unwelcome news (denial), selective awareness can also be pursued by
investing more resources in retaining good ones (rehearsal, preserving evidence), when accurate
information retention is naturally imperfect but can be raised at some cost (this is like setting
m<0 in the above speciﬁcation). Both mechanisms lead to broadly similar results and can be
combined: what matters is that there be a possibility (and a motive) for diﬀerential awareness
of H and L, not how this is achieved. As mentioned earlier, ideological thought typically
involves willful inattention, distorted interpretations and repression of inconvenient facts, ex-
post rationalizations, etc. The model therefore emphasizes “optimal forgetting” or obfuscation
rather than than “optimal remembering”.
Given (1) and (8), it is easy to see that it is only in state L that agents may want to censor
their signal: someone with anticipatory utility would not want to substitute bad news for good
ones. I therefore focus here on cognitive decisions in state L, denoted simply
(9) λ ≡ Pr[ˆ σ = L|σ = L].
Later on I consider more general payoﬀs structures than (1), under which either state may
(endogenously) be censored.
While agents can process information selectively (or subjectively), their beliefs remain con-
strained by Bayesian rationality: at t =1 , agent i may no longer have direct access to the
original signal, but if he (as others) has a systematic tendency toward selective attention or
interpretation, he will take that into account, using Bayes’ rule to form posteriors. Thus, when
ˆ σi = L the agent knows that the state is L, but when ˆ σi = H his posterior belief is only
(10) Pr
£
σ = H | ˆ σi = H,λi¤
=
q
q +( 1− q)(1 − λi)
≡ r(λi),
where λi is is his equilibrium rate of realism.20 In particular, for an agent who systematically
censors bad signals, being aware of only good signals is uninformative, r(0) = q.
4. Voting. To keep the model as transparent as possible, I abstract from heterogeneity
in preferences or productivities. The unanimity of votes that will result is clearly unrealistic,
but could be eliminated by introducing “partisan” agents with ﬁxed preferences for either zero
20It is straightforward to allow for agent naiveté, parametrized for instance by a coeﬃcient χ ≤ 1 multiplying
(1 − q)(1 − λ
i) in (10). This leaves all the positive results unchanged but can aﬀect the welfare conclusions. See
Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006) for such a treatment, as well as extensive discussions of the experimental and
ﬁeld evidence on motivated beliefs and selective recall.
10or maximal provision of government services.21 Diﬀerent social cognitions would then tip the
majority rather than the whole electorate, but the basic message would remain unchanged (see
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) for a similar eﬀect in a redistributive-policy context). Finally, given
the continuum of agents, there is no state of the world in which a single voter can be pivotal,
hence no incentive for anyone to strategically alter his vote or his cognitive choices so as to upset
the equilibrium. Agents are assumed to vote sincerely based on the information they have at
the time (t =1 )and, when making their initial information-processing decisions (t =0 ) , to take
the expected majority outcome as beyond their control.22
3S t a t i s t i d e o l o g y
“The French Social Model is neither ineﬃcient nor outdated. It has a great ambition which
can be expressed simply: permanently to level up. We must keep it. In a way it’s our
national genius. It is a necessity.” (French President Jacques Chirac, July 14, 2005).
I now study the possibility of diﬀerent societal beliefs, each associated to diﬀerent public
policies and private decisions. In doing so, I focus on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria: λj ≡ 1
(Realism) and λj ≡ 0 (Statist Ideology).
3.1 Sustaining realism
When λj ≡ 1, everyone acknowledges what public policy can or cannot deliver and responds
appropriately, investing ej =( E − τθL)/γ in state L and ej =( E − τθH)/γ in state H, achiev-
ing hj = E in either case. A representative voter’s date-1 expected utility from implementing a
policy τ is thus s + δ times
(11) 1 − τ − (E − τθL)/γ + E
in the ﬁrst case, and the same expression with θL replaced by θH in the second. Therefore, by
(2), voters unanimously choose τL =0in state L and the maximum feasible rate τH =¯ τ in
state H.
Since the policy outcome is diﬀerent in each state, any agent who had censored at t =0the
fact that σ = L will be inescapably confronted again with that reality at t =1 , thus depriving
him of the beneﬁts of wishful thinking (and leaving his investment undistorted). Anticipating
21For instance, some agents for whom θ
i ≡ 0 in both states and α
i =0 , and others for whom θ
i ≡ θH in both
states and α
i =1 .
22This simpliﬁes the analysis and is realistic. At the same time, it is not essential to the results -what matters
is that there be some aspect of the equilibrium environment that lies beyond their control (e.g., capital stocks
inherited from past generations’ political choices as in Section 5 below, or other agents’ private behavior as in
Bénabou (2007)).
11this, no one will invest in denial, which would only waste the cost m. Consequently, λ =1is
always an equilibrium.
This result reﬂects a ﬁrst general idea: interacting with realists makes it more diﬃcult to
sustain delusions; conversely, the more others avoid the truth, the easier it is for one to avoid
it —if so desired.23 While this is straightforward, note how information aversion reverses a key
property of standard models in which agents value accurate signals. In such models, their
decisions are naturally substitutes: the more others invest in obtaining private signals, the more
informative is the market price (or other aggregate variable), and thus the lower each individual’s
incentive to pay for information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). When people seek instead to
avoid, dismiss or distort unwelcome information, their actions are complements: the more others
ignore or distort their signals, the more eﬀectively each one can do so.
In the present context, this general mechanism has the stark implication that λ =1is
sustainable as a social equilibrium for all values of s. This, however, is due to the assumption
that when agents experience anticipatory feelings, they are no longer in doubt over which policy
has prevailed — only over what its long-run eﬀects will be. More generally, when anticipation
also occurs prior to the determination of τ,with importance sφ, λ =1is an equilibrium when24
(12) s ≤
m/δφ
(θH/γ − 1)¯ τ
≡ ˆ s.
The numerator reﬂects the absence of choice distortion (the only private cost of denial is m),
while the denominator represents the ﬁnancial savings agents can hope to realize by implement-
ing an eﬀective public policy in the good state.
3.2 Sustaining ideology
When λj ≡ 0, agents avert their eyes from the limitations and burdens of the welfare state and
“read” both signals as H, resulting in a constant posterior r(0) = q on the state truly being H.
From (7), they respond to τ by investing ei =( E − τθH)/γ, which is the optimal amount in
state H but falls short by τ∆θ/γ in state L. A representative voter at date 1 is one citizen inter
alia with posterior belief q, so his expected utility from implementing a tax rate τ is now s + δ
times
(13) 1 − τ − (E − τθH)/γ + qE +( 1− q)(E − τ∆θ).
23On a related point, Kuran (1993) contains an interesting (albeit informal) discussion of potential mechanisms
by which ideas which are not explicitly expressed in society may eventually come to disappear from it.
24 For instance, anticipatory payoﬀs may be proportional to the duration of the relevant period of uncertainty:
s
0 = φs and s
00 =( 1− φ)s, where s is some baseline intensity and voting takes place at date 1+φ. If o c u st h e
exposition on the case φ =0 , so that ˆ s =+ ∞, and treat the more general case in the appendix.
12The net marginal value of τ is positive, provided
(14) θH/γ > 1+( 1− q)∆θ,
and voters ignorant or in denial about the true state will then choose τH = τL =¯ τ.
As the prevailing policy no longer reveals the state of the world, it is now feasible for an
agent to maintain ignorance of a signal he initially censored. To determine whether it is optimal
for him to remain blind to “government failures”, consider his cognitive problem at t =0 , in
state L.
If he retains the bad news, he will correctly invest ei =( E − ¯ τθL)/γ but have to live with
the knowledge that the taxes levied are unproductive and that everyone else is underinvesting
due to their excessive faith in the state, with adverse implications for his or his oﬀspring’s future
prospects. His expected intertemporal utility will thus be (R stands for “realism”):
(15) Ui
0,R ≡ δ (s + δ)[1− ¯ τ − (E − ¯ τθL)/γ + αE +( 1− α)(E − ¯ τ∆θ)].
If the agent goes along with the prevailing ideology, he too will underinvest, but be able to
maintain, in proportion to r(λi), the comforting hope of a better future in which public expen-
diture will prove eﬀective and there will be no shortfall of the public good. Hence (D stands for
“denial”):
Ui







(E − ¯ τ∆θ)
¤
+ δ2 [E − ¯ τ∆θ].
Agent i’s ex-post incentive to repress negative news, given that others are doing so (λj =0 )and







/δ = −m/δ − (s + δ)(α − 1/γ)¯ τ∆θ + sr(λi)¯ τ∆θ.
The ﬁrst two terms are the costs of denial —direct cost plus underinvestment. The last term is
the gain in anticipatory utility: by maintaining hope that θ = θH the agent avoids facing the
fact that, due to others’ ideological blindness, society is on the wrong track, wasting resources
and ending up with a suboptimal level of (say) education or health ¯ h.
This reﬂects a second (and more novel) general insight, which in Bénabou (2007) I termed the
Mutually Assured Delusion (MAD) principle: when others’ denial of an unpleasant reality leads
them to act in ways that further worsen an agent’s prospects, this increases his own incentive to
engage in wishful thinking, making cognitive strategies complements. Conversely, when others’










Figure 4: Societal beliefs on state versus market
are substitutes. The political and economic interactions considered here clearly belong to the
ﬁrst case. Indeed, when an ideological electorate votes for the wrong policy, each citizen suﬀers
an expected loss (ﬁscal channel).25 Moreover, if people’s distorted view of what the state or
market will deliver leads them to underinvest in their children’s education, undersave for their
retirement, etc., there will be further collective losses to bear (interactions channel).Hence the
following results, illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 1 (Statist ideology) 1) Assume (2), (7) and (14). For
(18) s ≥
m/δ + δ (α − 1/γ)¯ τ∆θ
(q − α +1 /γ)¯ τ∆θ
≡ ¯ s,
both realism (λ =1 )and collective denial (λ =0 )are equilibrium social cognitions. In the latter,
agents believe in and vote for a large government, in spite of good evidence that it is ineﬃcient.26
2) The more important the spillovers from a good, and the worse the eﬃciency of the state in
providing it, the more likely is statist ideology: ¯ s falls with 1 − α and (for m>0)w i t hθL.
Observers of continental Europe frequently note and puzzle at the persistent power of col-
lective reality-avoidance and adherence to comforting myths in preventing necessary reforms of
welfare states and statist economies.27 Proposition 1 sheds light on this phenomenon and on
t h ec o n d i t i o n st h a tm a k ei tm o r el i k e l y .T h eﬁrst one, unsurprisingly, is a more favorable prior
(a higher q), perhaps inherited from a previous period of war reconstruction during which ex-
tensive state intervention was indeed eﬀective, even indispensable. Second, the more important
is the public-good nature of the activity under consideration (e.g., education versus pensions),
25In a symmetric context. Looking at tax and spending policies with unequal incidence is a natural direction
for further research.
26When agents derive anticipatory utility both prior to and after the setting of τ, with importance s
0 = φs and
s
00 =( 1− φ)s as in footnote 24, (18) is unchanged but (12) is now required for the λ =1equilibrium to exist.
For ¯ s<ˆ s, these two conditions deﬁne an interval for s leading to multiplicity.
27See, e.g., on the case of France, Krugman (1997), Landier and Thesmar (2007), De Menil (2007) and Saint-
Paul (2007). The latter two authors also point to France’s extreme position in the World Public Opinion Survey
(2005) reported in Figure 1.
14the easier it is to sustain collective illusions concerning it. At the same time, the public-ﬁnance
link alone can suﬃce to give rise to ideological thinking: the proposition holds for α =1 .
The third result is somewhat striking: the worse the failings of a statist system, the greater
is the likelihood that agents will fall prey to ideological blindness —for which they pay personal
costs, including suboptimal investments in human or retirement capital.28 While this stark
form of the result is somewhat speciﬁcation-dependent, it points to more general message: a
worsening of state performance need not speed up reform, but can instead trigger ideological
“defenses” that will block or delay it further, until reality ﬁnally hits in a way that can no longer
be ignored or rationalized away.
3.3 Social welfare
This leads naturally to the question of whether social beliefs bearing on governments and markets
are ultimately useful or harmful to society. To answer it, I compare social welfare under realism
and denial —whether achieved as equilibria, or through some collective commitment mechanism
(such as considered later on).
Consider ﬁrst state σ = L, which occurs with probability 1 − q. When agents are realists
(setting λj =1in (15)), equilibrium welfare is U∗
L,R = δ(s + δ)[1− E/γ + E]. When they are
deniers (setting λj =0in (16)), it is:
(19) U∗
L,D = −m + δ (s + δ)[1− E/γ + E +¯ τ (θH/γ − 1) − ¯ τ∆θ]+δsq¯ τ∆θ,
where the last term reﬂect the value of maintaining hope in the eﬃcacy of the state.
Proposition 2 1) Following bad news (state L), there is a threshold s∗ ≷ ¯ s such that realism
leads to higher welfare than statist ideology if and only if s<s ∗. When s∗ > ¯ s either equilibrium
can lead to higher ex-post welfare, depending on s.
2) When s∗ < ¯ s, where statist ideology is an equilibrium it dominates realism, and for s ∈ (s∗, ¯ s)
agents would be better oﬀ in state L if everyone could commit to ignoring bad news.
Consider now welfare in state H, which occurs with probability q. Given (14), in both
equilibria the tax rate is ¯ τ and agents invest ej=(E − ¯ τθH)/γ. When λ =0 , however, they
cannot be sure of whether the signal was truly H, or it was really L and they censored the bad
news, in which case everyone will underinvest. Due to this “rational doubt”, welfare in state H
28By contrast, a downward shift in the entire probability distribution of what public intervention is capable of
achieving relative to the market, even in the best state (an increase in γ, which lowers θ − γ uniformly across
states) reduces the scope for statist ideology. Note also that if the pure cost of information censoring m increases
in proportion to the “size” of the news ∆θ, a change in θL or θH leaves the equilibrium set unchanged.
15is now lower in an ideological society:29
U∗
H,R = δ (s + δ)[1− E/γ + E +¯ τ (θH/γ − 1)], (20)
U∗
H,D = U∗
H,R − s(1 − q)¯ τ∆θ. (21)
Averaging over the two states, ﬁnally, the gain from raising expectations in state L and the loss
from lowering them in state H (last terms in (19) and (21) respectively) just cancel, reﬂecting
Bayes’ rule. The net welfare impact of denial is thus an unambiguous loss
(22) U∗
0,D − U∗
0,R = −(1 − q)[m + δ(s + δ)¯ τ(1 − θL/γ + ∆θ(1 − 1/γ))],
incurred in state L.
Proposition 3 1) Following good news (state H), welfare is always higher, the more realistic
agents are when faced with bad news (state L).
2) Ideology always lowers ex ante welfare.
Thus, even when ideological thought generates social welfare gains in state L, those are
always dominated by the losses it induces in state H. This normative result has important
positive implications for how societies deal with “unwelcome news” and those bearing them.
3.4 Ideology, dissent, and freedom of speech
Suppose now that, in state L, an individual or group with a lower s or a diﬀerent payoﬀ structure
attempts to bring (back) to everyone’s attention evidence of the public sector’s low eﬃciency.
If this occurs after policy has already been set and agents have made their private investments,
all it does is to reduce everyone’s’ utility in (5), so they will refuse to pay attention or may
even try to silence the dissenter (pay a new cost to eliminate the signal). Anticipating that
others will behave in this way, in turn, allows everyone to more conﬁdently engage in ideological
denial. More strikingly, even bad news that comes in time to correct course can be unwelcome:
when s>s ∗, the citizens would rather keep their pleasant illusions and “stay the course” than
admit to a bleak future. Bringing back evidence about the state really being L (and society’s
opportunity set thus disappointingly limited) will again make everyone worse oﬀ, leading to
a universal unwillingness to listen and rejection of dissenters. And yet, ideological cognition
always remains socially harmful ex ante. This tension provides a new rationale for why societies
ﬁnd it desirable to set up commitment mechanisms such as constitutional rights to free speech,
29This “shadow of doubt” cast over the good state by the censoring of the bad state could also distort some
decisions in state H, although in this instance it does not. Conversely, departing from Bayesian updating, for
instance by introducing a “naivete” coeﬃcient χ ≤ 1 multiplying 1−λ in (10), would attenuate the losses in state
H and thus allow ex-ante gains. See Bénabou and Tirole (2002) for examples of both eﬀects.
16independence of the press, etc. If eﬀective, these will ensure that bad news will most likely
“resurface” ex-post in a way that is hard to ignore, thus lowering the ex ante return (or raising
the cost) of investing in denial.
4 Laissez-faire ideology
“Capitalism is based on self-interest and self-esteem; it holds integrity and trustworthiness
as cardinal virtues and makes them pay oﬀ in the marketplace, thus demanding that men
survive by means of virtues, not of vices. It is this superlatively moral system that the welfare
statists propose to improve upon by means of preventative law, snooping bureaucrats, and
the chronic goad of fear” (Alan Greenspan, 1963).
The model so far helps explain the puzzle of countries that persist in an overoptimistic view
of the eﬀectiveness of the state —or of their own national brand of government intervention—
relative to the market. The Mutually Assured Delusion principle cuts both ways, however, and
can also take the form of anti-government ideology and blindness to market failures.30 The
example of health insurance in the United States was mentioned earlier, but other widespread
anti-interventionist beliefs are also at odds with the facts. One is the public’s vast overestimation
of the “excessive” shares of public spending going to domestic welfare, fraction of people on
welfare, and level of welfare beneﬁts, or the even larger perceptual biases found concerning
foreign aid.31 Another example concerns estate taxation, which many middle and working class
voters implausibly perceive as likely to aﬀect them or their children, and consequently oppose.32
To demonstrate the workings of laissez-faire ideology, I simply extend (1) to:
(23) hi =m i n
©
γei + θ(τ − κ),E
ª
and distinguish two cases.33
30It is interesting, in that respect (and in light of the latest crisis in ﬁnancial markets) to relate this section’s
opening quotation to a later one: “An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business community”... The
trouble, unfortunately, is that the shock of what has happened will keep malfeasance down for a while. But human
nature being what it is —and memories fade- it will be back. And it is important that at that time appropriate
legislation be in place to inhibit activities that we would perceive to be inappropriate” (Alan Greenspan, 2002a,b;
emphasis added).
31Thus, in Kuklinski et al. (2000), survey respondents’ average estimate of welfare’s share in the federal budget
was around 9%, versus the actual 1%. All six measures of bias in factual beliefs about welfare were highly correlated
across individuals, and powerful predictors of respondents’ attitudes towards the desirability of welfare cuts. On
opposition to welfare, see also Gilens (1999) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004). On mistrust of government, see
Kaiser et al. (1996b), and on foreign aid see that same source as well as the discussions and references in Caplan
(2007).
32See, e.g., Bartels (2005), who analyses data from the 2002 National Election Survey. For instance, 49% of
respondents believed that “most families have to pay” the tax, and among the 57% in favor of its repeal, 69%
cited as a reason the fact that “it might aﬀect YOU someday” The tax actually aﬀects only aﬀects 0.5% of estates.
33I focus here, as in the core part of Proposition 1, on the benchmark case in which agents already know the
policy when they experience anticipatory feelings —e.g., the vote on τ occurs at the start of period 1( φ =0 ) .
17a) When κ<¯ τ, state H remains (conditionally on τ =¯ τ) a more favorable state than state
L. One can then show that the results of the case κ =0carry through: for s large enough, a
statist-ideology equilibrium coexists with the realistic one.34
b) Assume instead that κ>¯ τ. One can then think of state H as a “market failure” state
in which there is a need for government intervention but, even when carried out to its fullest,
it will not suﬃce to restore the ﬁrst best. The MAD intuition can then be simply expressed as
follows: whereas agents “could live with” and realistically accept such a second-best situation,
an uncorrected market failure (third best) is much harder to face, resulting in a greater incentive
t om a i n t a i nf a i t hi nt h ei n v i s i b l eh a n d( ﬁrst best). Thus, alongside with the realistic equilibrium
in which citizens have recourse to government intervention when necessary, there exists for s
high enough an ideological one in which they systematically censor the signal σ = H and vote
against public provision.
The parallelism between the two cases can be seen by recasting the second one in terms of
the eﬀectiveness of market provision relative to the government alternative: ˜ θ ˜ H ≡− θL in state
˜ H ≡ L and ˜ θ˜ L ≡− θH in state ˜ L ≡ H, with respective probabilities ˜ q ≡ 1 − q and 1 − ˜ q and
voters choosing the degree of laissez-faire in policy, ˜ τ ≡ κ − τ ∈ [κ − ¯ τ,κ]. Apart from these
substitutions, the only condition that diﬀers is the one ensuring that agents acting on their priors
now choose τ =0 , which corresponds to the maximal value of ˜ τ.As shown in the appendix, (14)
is replaced by
(24) θL/γ < 1 − q∆θ.
Proposition 4 (Laissez-faire ideology). Assume (24) and let 1−q and κ respectively replace
q and ¯ τ in each of the conditions stated for Proposition 1.
1) For
(25) s ≥
m/δ + δ (α − 1/γ)κ∆θ
(1 − q − α +1 /γ)κ∆θ
≡ ¯ s,
both realism (λ =1 )and collective denial of market failures (λ =0 )are equilibrium social
cognitions. In the latter, agents distrust and vote against government provision in spite of good
evidence that it is necessary and eﬀective.
2) The more important the spillovers from a good, and the worse the market failure, the more
likely is laissez-faire ideology: ¯ s is decreasing in 1 − α and (for m>0)d e c r e a s i n gi nθH.
34It is also the unique ideological equilibrium if either κ ≤ 0 ( w h i c hi sa l l o w e di n( 2 3 )a sl o n ga sθH(¯ τ − κ)
r e m a i n sl e s st h a nE), or if q is large enough that the conditions of Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed. See Lemma 1
in the appendix.
18The welfare analysis is the same as with statist ideology, and so are its implications concerning
the necessity of constitutional (ex ante) protections for dissenting speech.
5 The role of history and public capital
Multiple equilibria are most interestingly thought of as the steady-states of a cumulative dynamic
process, with initial conditions and historical accidents determining which one the economy
converges to.
The relevant state variable here is public-sector capital: physical infrastructure, institutions,
civil-service human capital, etc. The larger the stock inherited from previous generations, the
greater is citizens’ incentive to believe that this is a productive asset that will deliver valuable
beneﬁts. If such is the prevailing ideology, in turn, voters will opt for high taxes and continued
investment in public capital, much of which will remain for the next generation. Conversely,
where there is little preexisting public capital, so that a meaningful stock would have to built
up at considerable tax expense, cognitive incentives go in the direction of thinking that it is not
really needed. Hence voters will not support public investment and a small public sector will
persist.
The following dynamic extension of the model formalizes this idea. The timeline in Figure
3 now represents the life-cycle of a representative generation, with no altruism links between
successive ones. Public services now ﬂow from a stock of public capital Kt,
(26) hi
t =m i n
©
γei
t + θ(Kt − κ),E
ª
,
which accumulates across generations according to
(27) Kt =( 1− d)Kt−1 + τt.
Thus, τt is tax-ﬁnanced investment in generation t and d<1 the depreciation rate (previously
equal to 1). Everything else in the model is unchanged, and in particular each generation
receives a signal σ ∈ {H,L} about the productivity of public capital, θ. The latter is, for
simplicity, i.i.d. across periods.35 Note that (26) is the same as (23), but with a state-dependent
κt ≡ κ − (1 − d)Kt−1. Therefore, the model leads to the following results.
First, starting from any K0 there exists a realistic equilibrium, in which public investment
occurs only in state H and capital evolves according to the diﬀerence equation (27), where τt
35It could also be persistent, e.g. constant, as long ase a c hg e n e r a t i o ni se i t h e r : i )u n a b l et oo b s e r v e ,o r
observes only with suﬃcient noise, the output and consumption outcomes of previous generations (their previous
policy choice, on the other hand, contain no information along a denial equilibrium); or: ii) able to treat such
observations as any other initial signal about the state that can be denied, forgotten, rationalized away, etc.
19is i.i.d., equal to ¯ τ with probability q and to 0 with probability 1 − q. The average (stochastic
steady-state) capital stock is K∗
R ≡ q¯ τ/d.
Second, if preceding generations invested enough that (1−d)Kt−1 >κ−¯ τ,generation t faces
the same problem as analyzed in Section 3: since κt < 0,His both the state in which θ is high
and a “better” state to be in than L.T h u s ,i fs is high enough, it is an equilibrium for agents
to ignore any negative signal about public-sector eﬃciency and invest the maximum τt =¯ τ in
both states.
Conversely, if previous generations did not invest, or invested little enough that (1−d)Kt−1 <
κ−¯ τ,generation t faces the same problem as analyzed in Section 4: κt > ¯ τ,so even when using
policy to maximal eﬀect, H is now a worse state to be in than L.T h u s ,i fs is high enough, it is
an equilibrium for agents to ignore any positive signal about public-sector eﬃciency (or negative
signal about market eﬃciency) and invest nothing in both states, τt =0 .









LF ≡ 0 <K≡
κ − ¯ τ
1 − d








Proposition 5 Let (28) hold and let q satisfy the conditions listed in both Proposition 1 and
Proposition 4. For s above some ﬁnite threshold:
1) For K0 > ¯ K, there is a unique ideological equilibrium, which is statist: agents in each
generation censor L signals and invest ¯ τ in public capital. The capital stock Kt converges
monotonically to the steady-state K∗
ST =¯ τ/d.
2) For K0 <K , there is a unique ideological equilibrium, which is laissez-faire: agents in each
generation censor H signals and invest nothing in public capital. The capital stock Kt converges
monotonically to the steady-state K∗
LF =0 .




, there is a multiplicity of ideological equilibrium paths.
Both ideology and policy thus exhibit history-dependence, mediated by the stock of public-
sector assets. When it is high enough or low enough, there is a unique “adapted” ideology that
can take hold and become self-sustaining. For intermediate values, which ideology emerges as
dominant is indeterminate and depends (as usual) on how agents’ expectations are coordinated.
206C o n c l u s i o n
While I have focussed here on ideologies concerning the state versus the market, the model
illustrates three more general points that are applicable to most collective beliefs such as those
concerning trust in others, poverty and redistribution, culture, identity and religion.
First, individuals’ cognitive approaches to information, and thus their resulting perceptions of
reality, are highly interdependent. In particular, subjective beliefs both shape social institutions
and optimally adapt to them. Second, this leads to the development of history-dependent,
mutually incompatible visions of how the world works, some of them embodying evidence-
resistant delusions that severely impede necessary reforms. Third, while concepts such as wishful
thinking, collective denial or ideology used to lie outside the realm of economics, today we
increasingly have the tools to model and analyze them rigorously. In particular, an explicitly
information-based approach can capture the key phenomenon of “not wanting to know” that is
central to most ideologies. It also leads, as we saw, to new results concerning the desirability
of constitutional protections for free speech, even though ex-post society will often unanimously
prefer to ignore or silence the bearers of bad news.
W h i l eD eT r a c y ’ sv i s i o no fau n i ﬁed “science of ideas” is still some years away, the recent
rapprochements between political science, economics and psychology are moving us closer. In
particular, a rich and exciting research agenda lies ahead in the bringing together of political
economy with social and political psychology.
21Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1I ﬁrst treat the benchmark case discussed in the text and Propo-
sition, in which agents experience anticipatory feelings only after τ is chosen. Since the ex-post
incentive for denial, given by (17), is increasing in r(λi), there is a unique (Bayesian Perfect)
equilibrium of agent i’s intrapersonal game of information transmission between t =0and t =1 .
This unique “best response” to λ−i =0involves denial with probability 1 if and only if (17)
is positive for ri = r(0) = q, which corresponds to s satisfying (18); note that (7) implies
q>α− 1/γ. For s above this threshold (and in that case only), λ =0is a social equilibrium.
Together with the results in the text on the existence of the λ =1equilibrium, this establishes
the Proposition.
I now extend the results to the more general case with anticipatory feelings both before and
after voting. Period 1 is now divided into two subperiods, of durations φ and 1−φ respectively.
At t =1+φ, agents ﬁr s tv o t eo nat a xr a t eτ, then choose their levels of private investment.
As before: (i) the remaining disposable income is consumed only in period 2; (ii) during the
remainder of period 1, agents experience anticipatory utility, parametrized by s00, over their














leading —in each state— to the very same decisions over ei and τ as before (case φ =0 ), under
the same parameter assumptions and with s simply replaced by s00.
During the ﬁr s tp a r to fp e r i o d1, however, prior to the setting of τ (which may reveal the
state) and the ej’s, agents now experience a ﬂow payoﬀ s0Ei
1
£




poral preferences at t =0are again the expected present value of all future payoﬀs, which now
takes the form (reducing to the basic model when s0 =0 ):
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In an ideological equilibrium,(λj ≡ 0), the tax rate must be the same in both states and




0 is the same as before, except that s is now replaced by s0 + s00 ≡ s. Consequently, this
equilibrium exists under the same conditions as stated in the text of Proposition 1.
In a realism equilibrium (λj ≡ 1), voters are informed and choose τ =¯ τ in state H and τ =0
in state L (recall from what precedes that equilibrium tax rates and eﬀort levels are unchanged
by the presence of a prior subperiod of savoring, since the latter is “sunk” by the time decisions
22are made). Therefore, looking forward, an agent learning that σ = L at t =0knows that no
matter whether he censors the signal or not, he will be fully informed by t =1+φ. His expected




1+s0 + s00 + δ
¢
[1 − E/γ + E].
Under denial, it diﬀers only by the fact that, between t =1and t =1+φ the agent will expect
(with probability r(λi))t h es t a t eθ = θH, with associated policy τ =¯ τ,and he will consequently
invest only (E − ¯ τθH)/γ. Thus:
(A.4) Ui
0,D − Ui
0,R = −m + δs0r(λi)(θH/γ − 1)¯ τ.
Since the ex-post incentive for denial is increasing in λi, there is again a unique equilibrium for
agent i. It involves realism, and is thus consistent with λ =1being a social equilibrium, if and
only if Ui
0,D − Ui
0,R ≤ 0 for λi =1 , which translates into (12).






m/δ + δ (α − 1/γ)¯ τ∆θ








(θH/γ − 1)¯ τ
¶
,
deﬁning a nonempty interval for s provided φ/(1 − φ) is below some simple threshold. ¥







/δ = −m/δ +( s + δ)(θH/γ − 1)¯ τ − [s(1 − q)+δ]¯ τ∆θ.
This expression is increasing in s, since θH/γ − 1 > (1 − q)∆θ by (14). It is positive if
(A.7) s>
m/δ + δ [∆θ − (θH/γ − 1)]¯ τ
[θH/γ − 1 − (1 − q)∆θ]¯ τ
≡ s∗.
To show that s∗ can be above or below ¯ s, I focus on the case where m =0 . From(18) and (A.7),
¯ s<s ∗ then takes the form
α − 1/γ
q − α +1 /γ
<
∆θ − (θH/γ − 1)






∆θ − (θH/γ − 1)
,
or ∆θ(1 − α +1 /γ) >θ H/γ − 1. S o ,g i v e n( 1 4 ) ,i f
(A.8) 1+( 1− q)∆θ<θ H/γ < 1+( 1− α +1 /γ)∆θ,
then ¯ s<s ∗. In this case, the denial equilibrium leads to lower (interim) welfare in state L than
the realism equilibrium for s ∈ (¯ s,s∗), and to higher welfare for s>s ∗. T h eo p p o s i t er a n k i n g
23applies when θH/γ > 1+( 1− α +1 /γ)∆θ. ¥
The following lemma extends Proposition 1 to the more general technology given by (23),
a n di tw i l lb ea l s ou s e di np r o v i n gP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Lemma 1 For all κ with 0 ≶ κ<¯ τ in (23), Proposition 1 applies unchanged, with ¯ τ simply
replaced by ¯ τ − κ in (2) and (18). Furthermore, if κ ≤ 0 the statist equilibrium in which agents
censor L signals and τ =¯ τ is the only (pure-strategy) ideological one. In particular, there can
be no equilibrium in which they censor H signals.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps, focusing respectively on statist equilibria, in which
state L is miscoded or misremembered as H (these will be abbreviated as L → H equilibria)
and on laissez-faire ones, in which state H is miscoded or misremembered as L (these will be
abbreviated as H → L equilibria).36
Step 1. Existence of L → H equilibrium.
a) Consider ﬁr s ts u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u mi nw h i c hτ −κ>0. The arguments used in the text to
establish (13) apply unchanged with τ −κ substituted for τ.Condition (14) then implies that τ
must equal ¯ τ,and the rest of the proof of Proposition 1 applies unchanged with ¯ τ−κ substituted
for ¯ τ, as long θH(¯ τ − κ) <E ,which amounts to the same substitution in condition (2).
b) Consider an L → H equilibrium in which τ −κ ≤ 0. Since μi = q in such an equilibrium,
an agent’s investment problem is now
(A.9) max
e {1 − τ − e + α[qmin{γe+ θH (τ − κ),E} +( 1− q)min{γe+ θL (τ − κ),E}]}.
Given that αγ > 1, the solution is
(A.10) γei =
(
E + θH(κ − τ) if qαγ ≥ 1
E + θL(κ − τ) if qαγ < 1
.
In the ﬁrst case, the voter’s problem is again deﬁned by (13) and, given (14), this leads to
τ =¯ τ>κ ,a contradiction. In the second case, the voter’s problem becomes
(A.11) max
τ {1 − τ − (E + θL(κ − τ))/γ + E − q∆θ(κ − τ)}.
If θL/γ > 1 − q∆θ t h ed e r i v a t i v ei nτ is positive, leading again to a contradiction. If θL/γ <
1 − q∆θ (this is condition (24) in the text; I abstract from the measure-zero case where there
is equality), then τ =0is chosen. Moving back to t =0 , consider now the agent’s cognitive
36It is easy to show (as in Bénabou (2007)) that for all m>0 there can be no equilibrium in which both states
are miscoded (even with mixed strategies). With m =0there could be such “babbling” equilibria but they are
of no interest and can be eliminated as such, or by assuming an arbitrarily small positive lower bound for m.
24problem (or incentive constraint) in state L, knowing that the equilibrium tax rate will be τ =0:
(A.12) Ui
0,R/δ =( s + δ)[1− (E + θLκ)/γ + E]
Ui
0,D/δ = −m/δ + δ [1 − (E + θLκ)/γ + E]+s[1 − (E + θLκ)/γ + E − qκ∆θ] (A.13)
= U0,R/δ − m/δ − sqκ∆θ.
For κ<0 this could be an equilibrium, but for κ ≥ 0 it cannot, so the only L → H equilibrium
in this case has τ =¯ τ.
Step 2. Ruling out H → L equilibria.
a) Consider ﬁrst such an equilibrium in which τ − κ<0. Posteriors are again equal to q in
both states so, as in part (b) of Step 1, if qαγ ≥ 1 then γei = E − θH(τ − κ) and the same
derivation of the the equilibrium tax rate leads again to τ =¯ τ, a contradiction. If, on the
contrary, qαγ < 1, then as before we also need θL/γ < 1 − q∆θ to have voters choose τ =0
rather than τ =¯ τ.Under these conditions, the agent’s cognitive problem at t =0is now, in the
relevant state H,
Ui
0,R/δ =( s + δ)[1− (E + θHκ)/γ + E − (1 − α)κ∆θ], (A.14)
Ui
0,D/δ = −m/δ + δ [1 − (E + θLκ)/γ + E − κ∆θ] (A.15)
+s[1 − (E + θLκ)/γ +( 1− q)E + q(E − κ∆θ)]







/δ = −m/δ +( 1− q)sκ∆θ − (s + δ)(α − 1/γ)κ∆θ.
Therefore, if κ ≤ 0 there is no H → L equilibrium. For further use, note that for κ>0 there is
one if provided‘
(A.16) s ≥
m/δ + δ (α − 1/γ)κ∆θ
(1 − q − α +1 /γ)κ∆θ
,
which is the right-hand-side of (25).
b) Consider now an H → L equilibrium in which τ − κ>0. Recall that under (7), (14)
and with posterior belief q, this leads to γei = E + θH(κ − τ) and τ =¯ τ. The agent’s cognitive
problem at t =0in state H is now
(A.17) Ui
0,R/δ =( s + δ)[1− ¯ τ − (E + θH(¯ τ − κ))/γ + E],
25Ui
0,D/δ = −m/δ + δ [1 − ¯ τ − (E + θH(¯ τ − κ))/γ + E] (A.18)
+s[1 − ¯ τ − (E + θH(¯ τ − κ))/γ + E − (1 − q)(¯ τ − κ)∆θ)]








/δ = −m/δ − sq(¯ τ − κ)∆θ<0.
Thus, there cannot be an H → L equilibrium with τ − κ>0, and a fortiori with κ ≤ 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4 I will in fact show a stronger result, which corresponds to the
“mirror image” of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Proposition 4 holds for all 0 <κ≶ ¯ τ. Furthermore, if κ ≥ ¯ τ the laissez faire
equilibrium in which agents censor H signals and τ =0is the only (pure-strategy) ideological
one. In particular, there can be no equilibrium in which they censor L signals.
Proof. With the notation deﬁned in the text, (23) becomes
(A.20) hi =m i n
n
γei + ˜ θ˜ τ,E
o
and the investment choice of an agent with posterior belief ˜ μi ≡ 1 − μi on the state being ˜ H












1 − ˜ μi¢
min
n
γe+ ˜ θ˜ L˜ τ,E
oio
,
which is identical to (6) except for the tildes and the change of −τ into ˜ τ − κ in the ﬁrst term.
The proof that an equilibrium with λ =1always exists, with ˜ τ taking its maximal value κ in
state ˜ H and its minimum value κ − ¯ τ in state ˜ L, is then identical to the earlier one. The proof
concerning ideological equilibria again proceeds in two steps.
Step 1. Existence of an H → L (i.e., ˜ L → ˜ H) equilibrium.
a) Consider ﬁrst such an equilibrium in which κ − τ>0. The relevant analogue of (7) is
(A.22) αγ > 1 ≥ (1 − ˜ q)αγ = qαγ.
These conditions, together with the fact that ˜ θ˜ L˜ τ = −θH (κ − τ) < −θL (κ − τ) ≡ ˜ θ ˜ H˜ τ, imply
that when agents know the state is ˜ L (˜ μi =0 ) they invest ei =
³
E − ˜ τ˜ θ˜ L
´
/γ = E/γ +
(κ − τ)θH/γ, but under ignorance (˜ μi =˜ q), they invest only ei =
³
E − ˜ τ˜ θ ˜ H
´
/γ = E/γ +
(κ − τ)θL/γ.
In an ideological equilibrium (λ =0 )both states are coded as ˜ H, resulting in a posterior ˜ q
on the state being truly ˜ H.Agents then always invest (E−˜ τ˜ θ ˜ H)/γ, which is the optimal amount
26(conditional on ˜ τ) in state ˜ H, but will fall short by ˜ τ∆θ/γ in state ˜ L. A representative voter’s
date-1 expected utility from implementing a policy ˜ τ is then s + δ times:
(A.23) 1+˜ τ − κ − (E − ˜ τ˜ θ ˜ H)/γ +˜ qE +( 1− ˜ q)(E − ˜ τ∆θ),
which is identical to (11) except for the tildes and the change of −τ into ˜ τ − κ in the ﬁrst
expression. He will thus choose the maximum value, ˜ τ ˜ H =˜ τ ˜ L = κ, provided
(A.24) ˜ θ ˜ H/γ > −1+( 1− ˜ q)∆θ,
or, equivalently, θL/γ < 1−q∆θ, which is the relevant analogue to (14) and corresponds to (24).
Consider now agent i’s decision problem at t =0 , in state ˜ L. If he remains aware of the
news, he will invest ei =( E − κ˜ θ˜ L)/γ = E/γ + κθH/γ but know that everyone else is investing
only ej =( E − κ˜ θ ˜ H)/γ = E/γ + κθL/γ. His expected intertemporal utility will then be:
Ui
0,R = δ(s + δ)
h
1 − κ −
³
E − κ˜ θ˜ L
´
/γ + αE +( 1− α)(E − κ∆θ)
i
+ δ(s + δ)κ.
If, on the other hand, he goes along with society’s denial, he will also underinvest, but will savor
the thought of a more pleasant future in which government intervention is not really needed:
Ui
0,D = −m + δ
h
1 − κ − (E − κ˜ θ ˜ H)/γ
i
+ δ(s + δ)κ (A.25)
+ δs[˜ qE +( 1− ˜ q)(E − κ∆θ)] + δ2 [E − κ∆θ].
Thus Ui
0,R and Ui
0,D have the same expressions as before, except for the tildes and the fact that
¯ τ (the maximal value of τ)i sr e p l a c e db yκ (the maximal value of ˜ τ); hence the existence result.
b) Ruling out H → L (i.e., ˜ L → ˜ H) equilibria with κ − τ ≤ 0. The reasoning parallels that
in Step 1b of Lemma 1, with the same transformed variables as above. It is not explicited here
to minimize repetition.
Step 2. Ruling out L → H (i.e., ˜ H → ˜ L) equilibria. The reasoning parallels that in Step 2
of Lemma 1. It is again not explicited here to avoid repetition. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5For q i nt h et h ei n t e r m e d i a t er a n g ew h e r ei ts a t i s ﬁes the conditions
of both Propositions 1 and 4, the results follow from the fact, noted in the text, that each
generation faces a problem identical to the static one with κt ≡ κ − (1 − d)Kt−1.
Thus, for Kt−1 <K , i.e. (1 − d)Kt−1 <κ− ¯ τ, we have κt > ¯ τ, so by Lemma 2 a unique
ideological equilibrium exists (for s above a large enough but ﬁxed threshold, since κt remains
bounded) and it is laissez-faire, with τt =0 . As a result, Kt =( 1 −d)Kt−1 so the same conditions
holds in all subsequent periods, implying that ideology remains laissez faire and Kt+n converges
to zero.
27Conversely, for Kt−1 > ¯ K, i.e. (1 − d)Kt−1 >κ ,we have κt < 0, so by Lemma 1 a unique
ideological equilibrium exists (for s above a large enough but ﬁxed threshold) and it is statist,
with τt =¯ τ. As a result,
(A.26) Kt =( 1− d)Kt−1 +¯ τ>(1 − d) ¯ K +¯ τ = κ +¯ τ>κ / (1 − d),
by (29). So the same conditions hold in all subsequent periods, implying that ideology remains
statist and Kt+n converges to ¯ τ/d.
For Kt−1 ∈ [K, ¯ K],κ t ∈ [0,¯ τ] so the conjunction of Lemmas 1 and 2 implies that (again, for
s large enough) both L → H and H → L ideological equilibria exist. ¥
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